

The Legacy of Pro-Democracy Mass Protest and Democratic Survival: A Cross-National Survival Analysis from 1946 to 2016

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요 약

Why do some democratic countries experience democratic breakdown, while others endure? Even though various potential factors behind democratic breakdown or survival have been widely examined, we still cannot fully explain the different fates of democratic regimes. This article sheds light on the role of the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest during the transition period in democratic survival of democratic regimes. Using cross-national time-series data on 135 democratic regimes in 103 democratic countries and the Cox Proportional Hazard model, we demonstrate that the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest decreases the hazard rate of democratic breakdown. This relationship is consistently robust in alternative model specifications. Moreover, our empirical results indicate that nonviolent pro-democracy mass protests compared to violent ones exert much more substantive deterrent impacts on democratic breakdown.

주 제 어

Pro-Democracy Protest, Democratic Survival, Democratic Breakdown, Survival Analysis

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I. Introduction

Why do some democratic countries experience democratic breakdown, while others endure? As over 60 authoritarian or dictatorship countries surfing the past waves of democratization have been democratized and a non-negligible number of them experienced democratic breakdown, an abundance of scholarly effort has been devoted to potential economic and political determinants of democratic durability. However, although previous studies broaden our understanding about the fates of democracies (Levitsky & Way, 2013; Skocpol, 1979; Vítorna & Fallon, 2008), the role of pro-democracy mass protests during the period of democratization in determining the path of new democracies is still underexamined (Croissant & Haynes, 2021; Maeda, 2010; Pérez-Liñán & Mainwaring, 2013). Given that the role of civil societies and movements under non-democratic regimes has been studied as one of the driving factors behind democratization, it is unexpected that the literature on democratic breakdown seldom takes account of the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest which is classified as a historical factor (Kadivar, 2018).

This article opens this academic black box by shedding

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light on the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest and explains the variations in democratic durability. We argue that, if pro-democracy mass protests had occurred in a country in a period of democratic transition, public support for democracy and democratic values including human freedom, liberty aspirations, and civil and political rights would be stronger in that country compared to other countries. Moreover, the experience of pro-democracy mass protests increases the expected costs of repression and brings power to representatives devoting themselves to democratic principles and values. We expect that countries with the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest are less susceptible to democratic breakdown compared to others without it. Based on cross-national time-series data from 1946 to 2016 about democratic terminations around the globe, this article by applying the Cox Proportional Hazard model demonstrates that countries with the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest tend to have lower hazard rates of democratic breakdown. This relationship is consistently robust in alternative parametric survival model specifications. In addition, our empirical results show that the experience of nonviolent mass protests, compared to violent ones, has much stronger deterrent impacts on democratic breakdown.

The academic attempt to understand the fate of new democracies based on the experience of pro-democracy mass protests is not totally new. Unlike most previous studies on pro-democracy mass protests and democratic breakdown, a few exceptional studies have emphasized the importance of mass

mobilizations especially during transition periods in shaping the path of new democracies (Kadivar, 2018; Bayer, Bethke, & Lambach, 2016). For example, Kadivar (2018) demonstrates that a longer duration of unarmed mobilization during democratic transitions tends to lead to higher durability of democracies, while Bayer et al. (2016) show that the presence of nonviolent resistance campaigns makes democratic countries less prone to autocratic backslides.

Our study makes contributions to those literature by the following ways. First, while previous literature on the role of pro-democratic mass protests on democratic survival marginalizes competing theories, our study on the association between the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest and democratic breakdown takes relevant economic, political and social, and international factors into account. This attempt makes it possible to evaluate the relative explanatory power of pro-democracy mass protests compared to various internal and international factors. Second, our study examines the marginal effects of pro-democracy mass protests on democratic breakdown by quantifying the legacy of mass protest with frequencies, rather than by measuring it through a binary indicator (Bayer et al., 2016) or a duration of the longest protest in each country (Kadivar, 2018). Also, given that previous studies on determinants of democratic breakdown are empirically fragmented and mixed (Croissant & Haynes, 2021; Tomini & Wagemann, 2018), this article using large-N cross-national time-series analysis contributes to the literature on democratic breakdown not only by unveiling the conducive impacts of the

legacy of pro–democracy mass protest on democratic survival, but also by testing the generalizability of empirical findings from previous studies on potential factors of democratic breakdown. Last but not least, by estimating empirical models with series of variables, this article evaluates the explanatory powers of potential factors while other variables are controlled.

The rest of this article proceeds with the following order. It begins with a review of the previous literature on various factors contributing to democratic breakdown. Thereafter, this article presents a theory and derives a hypothesis about the relationship between the legacy of pro–democracy mass protest and the hazard rate of democratic breakdown. Next, in the empirical analysis section, the results from the Cox Proportional Hazard model will be presented with explanations about variables and model specifications. Finally, we conclude with the potential limitations of this study and plausible future directions to expand our study.

II. POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN

In this section, we thoroughly review previous literature on potential determinants of democratic breakdown defined as regime transition from democracy to non–democracy (Hiroi & Omori,

2009). Given that explanatory factors suggested in the literature on democratization do not always serve the same function in determining the likelihood of democratic breakdown or regression (Mahoney & Snyder, 1999; Moeller & Skaaning, 2013), we do not consider studies on the transition to democracy or regime stability.

Scholars have pointed out various factors of democratic breakdown with different perspectives in their explanatory models. First, the link between economic factors and democratic durability has been widely examined. Based on the branches of modernization theory (Lipset, 1959), the deterrent impacts of economic development and urbanization on democratic breakdown have been supported in numerous studies (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). In addition to the level of economic development, some scholars emphasize the importance of economic growth in the percentage of GDP (Gasiorowski & Power, 1998; Slater, Nair, & Smith, 2014; Weber, 2013), while others demonstrate that unequal distribution of wealth increases the hazard rate of democratic break down (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Diamond, 2021; Haggard & Kaufman, 2012; Kapstein & Converse, 2008b). Series of recent studies including both case studies (Aspinall & Hicken, 2020; Castaldo, 2020) and comparative studies (Cleary & Öztürk, 2020; Gerschewski, 2021) have continuously demonstrated the pivotal role of those economic factors.

A second perspective has explained variations in the likelihood of democratic breakdown with various political and social factors such as forms of government, party system, and

ethnolinguistic cleavage in democratic countries. About the forms of government, scholars over decades have vigorously debated whether parliamentary systems are more conducive than presidential ones to ensure the survival of democracy (Cheibub, 2007; Linz, 1994; Sing, 2010). Empirical results related to this debate are mixed at best. Scholars supporting the negative impacts of presidential democracy on democratic survival argue that the intrinsic features of presidential regimes such as the fixed term of presidents and a lower chance to form coalitions contribute to democratic breakdown (Linz, 1994). On the contrary, there is also evidence rebutting this argument (Elgie, 2008; Sedelius & Linde, 2018). Especially, a recent work from Sedelius and Linde (2018) demonstrates that democratic countries with presidential systems show even better performance records than parliamentary systems do.

Among the political and social factors, the party system of democratic countries frequently measured by the effective number of political parties has been considered as a potential factor of democratic breakdown (Linz & Stepan, 1996a; Sartori, 1994; Schneider, 2008). There are competing theories behind both positive and negative influence of multiparty system on democratic durability. A group of studies argues that democratic countries with multiparty system are more likely to be de-democratized because forming stable coalitions under the multiparty system is harder to be achieved (Cheibub, 2002; Golder, 2006; Mainwaring, 1993). However, other studies provide empirical supports for the positive impacts of the multiparty system in both presidential and parliamentary

democracies (Bernhard, Nordstrom, & Reenock, 2001; Gisselquist, 2008; Pereira & Melo, 2012).

Related to the ethnolinguistic fractionalization, several scholars have theorized that a higher degree of fractionality tends to cause political instability and social conflicts, which in turn can result in democratic regression (Diskin, Diskin, & Hazan, 2005; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972). Through a cross-national study, Ming (2010) empirically demonstrates that highly fractionalized democratic countries are more likely to be de-democratized rather than others.

In addition to the economic, political, and social factors, international conditions have also been spotlighted by scholars. Especially, scholars have explored the detrimental effects of the Cold War period and inter- and intrastate conflicts on democratic survival both empirically and theoretically (Berg-Schlosser & Mitchell, 2002; Møller, Skaaning, & Tolstrup, 2017; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). Moreover, with the perspective of regional diffusion processes, Gleditsch and Ward (2006) using a transition model unveil that the presence of democratic countries in the same geopolitical regions significantly strengthens democratic durability of a country in that region. Such diffusion mechanism has been supported by some prominent works (Houle, Kayser, & Xiang, 2016; Legler & Tiekou, 2010). Despite conflicting results, the trade openness of democratic countries is also regarded as a potential factor of democratic survival. Reuveny and Li (2003) find that economic globalization decreases the level of democracy, while Epstein, Bates, Goldstone,

Kpisrensen, and O'Halloran (2006) show that trade openness lowers the likelihood of democratic breakdown.

For sure, there are other kinds of variables examined previously as additional determinants of the fate of democratic countries. For instance, several scholars have argued that countries depending on natural resources including oil are susceptible to democratic breakdown and regime sustainability (Brinks, Leiras, & Mainwaring, 2014; Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001). Also, many scholars have examined the conductive impacts of the British colonial heritage on democratic survival. The evidence cumulated in support of this proportion has been substantial (Bernhard, Reenock, & Nordstrom, 2004; Huntington, 1984; Lipset, Seong, & Torres, 1993).

III. THE LEGACY OF PRO-DEMOCRACY PROTEST AND THE DETERRENCE OF DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN

Even though the economic, political, social, and international factors have been positioned at the center of the literature on democratic breakdown (Kapstein & Converse, 2008a), those factors do not fully explain why some democratic countries fail, while others survive. The goal of our study is to increase the strength of the explanatory model for democratic breakdown by shedding light on the role of pro-democracy mass protests during democratic

transition, which has been marginalized so far.

Previous time-series cross-national and comparative studies on the impact of pro-democracy protests have especially focused on the link between the protests and the emergence of democracy or the quality of democracy in the emerging democratic regimes (Bethke & Pinckney, 2016; Kadivar, Usmani, & Bradlow, 2020; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 2004). Despite the pessimistic view on the role of civil movements for democratization from the elitist approach (G. Casper & Taylor, 1996; Curry & Göedl, 2012; Giugni, 2007; Higley & Burton, 2006; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986), the pivotal role of pro-democracy movements on democratization has been theorized and supported. Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) argue that democratic movements, especially led by the working-middle class, facilitate democratic transition, and Tilly (2004) emphasizes that various forms of democratic civil movements as driving factors of democratization. Moreover, Bethke and Pinckney (2016) demonstrate that democratic regimes built on nonviolent resistance campaigns tend to enjoy a higher quality of democracy including freedom of expression and associational autonomy (see also, Kadivar et al. (2020).

The generalizability of the positive impact of democratic movements on democratic transition has also been supported by a series of case studies and comparative studies on democratization in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (Della Porta, 2014; Lee, 2002; Remi Aiyede, 2003). For instance, pro-democracy protests in Ukraine (2004) force corrupted governments to invalidate the

results of fraudulent elections and, in other countries including South Korea (1987) and Serbia (2000), authoritarian leaders were ousted from political power due to such protests (Brancati, 2014b).

In our study, we argue that the experience of pro-democracy mass protests before democratization not only promotes democratic transition or the quality of democracy, but also prevents democratized countries from going back to non-democratic regimes. We should note that the academic attempt to link pro-democracy mass protests during democratic transition period and the survival of emerging democratic regimes does not come from nothing. As Volk (2018: 15) mentioned as “Democracy is not just a regime but also social form of life which is shaped by democratic constitutionalism, the guarantee of fundamental political rights, rule of law, the history of social movements political protest, etc.,” the history of political protests tends to have non-negligible impacts on the democracy itself.

The relationship between the pro-democracy mass protests and the rate of democratic survival can be explained in two possible ways. First, the legacy of pro-democracy mass protests provides democratic experience to the public, and the public can internalize the value and importance of democracy through the mass movements during transition periods, which makes the public more resistant to democratic breakdown. Previous pioneering studies on civil society demonstrate that active civil society and movement are the prerequisite both of democratization and democratic consolidation (Cohen & Arato, 1994;

Diamond, 1994; Ozymy & Lee, 2007). A branch of literature on civil society originated from Alexis de Tocqueville claims that civil society is the place where democratic values and aspirations for democracy are disseminated. Other innovative works especially from Putnam (1993, 2000) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) note that civil movements and societies allow citizens to equip civic skills and to develop democratic values.

The above-mentioned studies support the link between the acceptance of democratic values and civil movements by arguing that social cohesion, trust, and tolerance can be obtained through the experience of such movements. In a similar vein, we argue that pro-democracy mass protests during transition periods will help the public to internalize and strengthen democratic values. Our argument is based on the findings from previous studies demonstrating that the experience of pro-democracy mass protests not only helps the public to internalize democratic values but also even strengthens the internalized democratic values over time (Chang, 2015; Ekiert & Kubik, 2001; Fishman, 2011; Fung, 2003; Putnam, 2000). A crucial work from Ekiert and Kubik (2001) through a case study on Poland demonstrates that the experience of pro-democracy protests tends to engender strong civil society opposing autocratization in the new democratic regimes.

Democratic values in such a society are to be enhanced among the public including both participants and non-participants of pro-democracy mass protests through the facilitation of public deliberation, the promotion of representation

quality, and the provision of direct participation in governance (Fung, 2003; Putnam, 2000). Rather indirectly, the strong civil society and the internalized democratic values among citizens built on the legacy of pro-democracy mass protests are likely to prevent democratic breakdown based on the diagonal accountability defined as the contribution of non-state actors such as civil society to accountability.³ A recent comparative study from Laebens and Lührmann (2021) raises the possibility that the diagonal accountability built on pro-democracy protests tends to halt autocratic backsliding.

In turn, at the aggregate level, the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest will ensure that citizens with democratic values are more likely to be wary of de-democratization. Furthermore, the internalization of democratic values can also facilitate the checks on the non-democratic power of post-transition governments (Kadivar, 2018). Based on the long-lasting theories that the internalized democratic values are the vital elements of democratic survival and consolidation (Hall, 1998; Linz & Stepan, 1996b), we expect that the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest decreases the likelihood of democratic breakdown.

Second, the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest can increase the expected costs of repression over the expected costs of tolerance, because politicians supporting non-democratic regimes lose their legitimacies and the legacy brings political

³ For overviews of various types of accountability, see Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020).

powers to others professing commitment to democratic principles. The pro–democracy mass protests tend to impose non–negligible governance costs on repressive actors by menacing the country’s economic viability (Gleditsch, Olar, & Radean, 2015), while public supporting democratic reform are likely to give non–autocratic actors the opportunity to sustain democratic regimes (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016; Johnson & Thyne, 2018). In addition, the history of pro–democracy mass protests and democratic transition gives signals of strong public discontent with autocratic regimes, and gives information to potential non–democratic actors that such regimes are not invincible (B. A. Casper & Tyson, 2014; Kim & Kroeger, 2019).

This proposed mechanism is rooted in civil society–based theories of democratization which argue that pro–democracy mass protests prevent repressive regimes or politicians from using repressive countermeasures against the protests, and the history of protests against those regimes leads to the maturation of latent oppositions (Bermeo, 1997; Braithwaite, Braithwaite, & Kucik, 2015; Brancati, 2014b; Bratton & Van de Walle, 1992; Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). Examples of the deterrent impacts of pro–democracy mass protests on repressive political actors after democratization include the Iberian Revolutions in Spain and Portugal (Bermeo, 1997) and the Colored Revolutions in Eastern Europe (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006). While democratic countries with the legacy of pro–democracy protest continue the momentum of marginalizing the role of politicians supporting non–democratic regimes after the transition, some countries without it, especially

post-communist politics, faced incumbent turnovers, democratic regressions, and backsliding, because the legitimacies of non-democratic regimes do not oscillate and the costs of repression to seize political power remains relatively low (Ekiert, Kubik, & Vachudova, 2007; McFaul, 2002).

Based on the above literature and mechanisms, we expect that democratic countries with the legacy of pro-democracy protest have a lower likelihood of democratic breakdown than does a democratic country without it, while all other things being equal (*ceteris paribus*).

IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This article relies on data about 135 democratic regimes in 103 democratic countries from 1946 to 2016 to evaluate the influence of the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest on democratic survival. We only focus on democratic countries, because the inclusion of non-democratic countries which have a zero-probability of democratic breakdown will bias the estimated coefficient of the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest.⁴ For

4 Since the probability of democratic breakdown of non-democratic countries is exactly zero, we do not lose any information about democratic breakdown by omitting those regime-year observations. Please see Boehmke (2009) in order to see how the inclusion of observations with zero probability can bias the

instance, the authoritarian regimes of Ukraine before 1994 are not included. The unit of observation is a regime–year, and the total number of observations is 3,390.

1. Variables

1) Dependent Variable

To measure democratic breakdown, this study uses the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset developed by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. Widely employed by recent studies on democratization and autocratization (Boese, Edgell, Hellmeier, Maerz, & Lindberg, 2021; Boese, Lindberg, & Lührmann, 2021; Skaaning, 2020), the ERT dataset built on a unique framework bridging transitologist (e.g., Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (1996), Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013)) and incrementalist (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and Teorell (2010)) perspectives provides information about 680 unique episodes of regime transformation since 1900 (for more information about the ERT dataset see, Maerz, Edgell, Wilson, Hellmeier, and Lindberg (2021)). The use of the ERT dataset prevents us from introducing bias in our empirical analysis due to an arbitrary classification of regime types.

estimated coefficient.

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2) Independent Variable

Following the academic tradition to identify pro–democracy mass protests (Brancati, 2014a; Brancati & Lucardi, 2019; Chenoweth, Stephan, & Stephan, 2011; Kadivar, 2018; Tarrow, 2013), this article defines a pro–democracy mass protest as “mass public demonstrations in which the participants demand countries install or uphold open and competitive elections.” (Brancati 2014a, 1504). Thus, pro–democracy mass protests include protests in which participants urge countries where free and fair elections are not held regularly to hold democratic elections, or demand for countries to hold more open and competitive elections (Brancati 2014a: 1512-1513).

To operationalize the legacy of pro–democracy mass protest, we employ the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset, developed by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013), which has been widely used as the main source to count the number of pro–democracy mass protests since its publication in 2013 (e.g. Cunningham (2013); Butcher and Svensson (2016); Gustafson (2020); Edwards and Arnon (2021)). NAVCO 2.0 dataset provides annual data on mass protests for regime change toward democracy from 1945 to 2006, with information about participation size and diversity, support from external actors, and outcomes (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). To fill up the data after 2006, we use the original dataset from Kadivar (2018). Based on those datasets and the definition of pro–democracy mass protest, we count the number of pro–democracy mass protests before each democratic country experiences democratic transitions.

3) Control Variables

To examine the independent influence of the legacy of pro-democracy protest, we include a series of control variables based on the previous literature on the factors of democratic breakdown. First, we control the expected conducive influence of countries' economic performance and the level of economic development based on the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the percent growth of GDP. The data are obtained from the World Bank and the Maddison Project Database (Bolt, Jong, & Zanden, 2018). GDP per capita is included as the logged form to reflect the non-linear impact of GDP per capita. Also, the degrees of economic inequality and urbanization are controlled.

Three political and social variables including government system, party system, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are included as control variables. Based on the categorization from the Quality of Government (QOG) database (Teorell et al., 2018), we use a categorical variable classifying countries into presidential (the reference category), semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems. The influence of the party system on democratic regression is parceled out through the effective number of political parties developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Golosov (2010). In addition, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index frequently used to capture the degree of ethnic polarization (Bossert, d'Ambrosio, & La Ferrara, 2011) is included as one of the control variables to control the expected negative influence of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.

A set of international factors are also controlled. Trade openness defined as the sum of total imports and exports is measured as a percentage of a country's GDP. Missing values are filled with the data from World Bank and Gleditsch (2002). Given that previous studies demonstrate that democratic breakdown is likely to occur during conflicts, we control the total number of conflicts in countries by relying on the data from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV). A binary variable, Cold War, is also included. It takes the value of 1 for observations from 1945 to 1991. Otherwise, 0 is assigned. In addition, the regional mean of Polity Score is used to evaluate the independent influence of pro-democracy protests from the influence of democracies existing in the same geopolitical regions.⁵

(Table 1) Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources

Variable	Types	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Data Source
Dependent Variable					
Democratic Breakdown	Binary	3,390	0,158	0,365	Source: ERT dataset
Independent Variable					
Pro-Democracy Protest	Count	3,390	1,157	1,339	Source: NAVCO 2 Data
Economic Control Variables					
GDP Growth (%)	Continuous	3,390	3,580	4,028	Source: World Bank

⁵ Divisions of geopolitical regions are based on the QOG dataset which divides geopolitical regions into 10 categories: Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union, Latin America, North Africa and Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe and North America, East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean.

Logged GDP per capita	Continuous	3,390	9,041	1,119	Source: Maddison Project Database (2018) Real GDP per capita in 2011 US\$
GINI Index	Continuous	3,390	38,162	9,584	Source: World Inequality Database
Urbanization (%)	Continuous	3,390	60,441	20,184	Source: V-Dem Dataset Variable Name: e_minurbani
Political and Social Control Variables					
Government System	Categorical	3,390	1,159	0,922	Source: QOG Dataset Variable Name: gtm_parl 0 means presidential, 1 stands for semi-presidential, and 2 denotes parliamentary.
Effective Number of Political Parties	Continuous	3,390	3,501	2,538	Source: QOG Dataset Variable Name: gol_enpp
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	Continuous	3,390	0,399	0,262	Source: QOG Dataset Variable Name: r_elf61, r_elf85
International Control Variables					
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	Continuous	3,390	63,272	35,447	Source: QOG Dataset Variable Name: wdi_trade
MEPV	Continuous	3,390	0,742	1,659	Source: MEPV Variable Name: acttotal
Cold War	Binary	3,390	0,394	0,489	1 is assigned to a country-year observation from 1946 to 1991, 0 otherwise.
Regional Mean Polity Score	Continuous	3,390	6,700	3,274	Source: Polity Project

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this article with their sources and types. Given that the changes in control variables are not immediately translated into the likelihood of democratic breakdown, all control variables are

lagged by one year. We check whether there is a multicollinearity problem in our empirical models with the variation inflation factors (VIFs) test. Across all models estimated in this study, the mean of VIFs among the independent and control variables is less than 2.00, and the individual VIFs according to each variable do not exceed 3.00. It means that there is no problematic multicollinearity among the variables.⁶

〈Table 2〉 Total Regime-Year Observations

Country	Democratic Regime	Country	Democratic Regime
Albania	2005–2016	Liberia	2006–2016
Argentina	1964–1965 1974–1975 1984–2016	Lithuania	1990–2016
Armenia	1990–1994	Luxembourg	1946–2016
Australia	1994–2016	Madagascar	1994–2000 2008–2008
Austria	1946–2016	Malawi	1995–1999 2010–2016
Bangladesh	1992–2001	Mali	1993–2011 2014–2016
Belarus	1992–1995	Mauritius	1968–2016
Belgium	1947–2016	Mexico	1996–2016
Benin	1992–2016	Moldova	1992–2004 2010–2016
Bhutan	2009–2016	Mongolia	1991–2016
Bolivia	1986–2016	Montenegro	2004–2005 2010–2012

⁶ There are no rules of thumb of testing multicollinearity in a statistical model. While some scholars argue that VIFs less than 10 indicate non-existence of severe multicollinearity (Chatterjee, 1991; Midi & Bagheri, 2010), others support more strict VIF-cut-offs such as 3 or 4 (Hair, Anderson, Babin, & Black, 2010).

Bosnia and Herzegovina	1997–2016	Namibia	1990–1993 1995–2016
Botswana	1967–2016	Nepal	2009–2011 2014–2016
Brazil	1987–2016	Netherlands	1946–2016
Bulgaria	1991–2016	New Zealand	1946–2016
Burkina Faso	1999–2014 2016–2016	Nicaragua	1990–2006
Canada	1946–2016	Niger	1993–1995 2000–2008 2011–2016
Cape Verde	1991–2016	Nigeria	2012–2016
Chile	1959–1972 1990–2016	Norway	1946–2016
Colombia	1991–2016	Panama	1991–2016
Costa Rica	1950–2016	Papua New Guinea	1974–1996 2002–2003
Croatia	2000–2016	Paraguay	1993–2016
Cyprus	1974–2016	Peru	1981–1991 2001–2016
Czech Republic	1990–2016	Philippines	1988–2003 2010–2016
Denmark	1946–2016	Poland	1990–2016
Dominican Republic	198–1989 1996–2016	Portugal	1976–2016
Ecuador	1980–2016	Romania	1991–2016
El Salvador	1999–2016	Senegal	1988–2016
Estonia	1990–1991 1993–2016	Serbia	2001–2012
Finland	1946–2016	Sierra Leone	2003–2016
France	1947–2016	Slovakia	1994–2016
Georgia	2004–2016	Slovenia	1990–2016
Germany	1949–2016	South Africa	1995–2016
Ghana	1980–1980 1996–2016	South Korea	1988–2016
Greece	1975–2016	Spain	1978–2016
Guatemala	1997–2016	Sri Lanka	1947–1981 1995–2004 2015–2016

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Guinea-Bissau	2015–2016	Suriname	1950–1979 1988–1990 199–2016
Guyana	1998–2016	Sweden	1946–2016
Honduras	1991–2008	Switzerland	1946–2016
Hungary	1990–2016	Tanzania	1996–2000 2008–2008 2010–2014
India	1952–1974 1977–2016	Thailand	1998–2005 2012–2012
Indonesia	1956–1957 1999–2016	Timor-Leste	2002–2016
Ireland	1946–2016	Trinidad and Tobago	1962–2016
Israel	1949–2016	Tunisia	2012–2016
Italy	1947–2016	Turkey	1966–1979 1988–2012
Ivory Coast	2016–2016	Ukraine	1994–1997 2006–2010
Jamaica	1955–1976 1984–2016	United Kingdom	1946–2016
Japan	1952–2016	United States of America	1946–2016
Kenya	2014–2015	Uruguay	1946–1972 1985–2016
Latvia	1990–2016	Venezuela	1963–2002
Lebanon	2010–2016	Zambia	2000–2013
Lesotho	2002–2016		
Number of Democratic Regimes: 135, Number of Democratic Countries: 103 Number of Regime-Year Observations: 3,390			

Table 2 shows the regime-year observations which are included in the empirical analysis in this article. As mentioned earlier, the number of democratic regimes in our analysis is 135, that of countries is 103, and the total number of regime-year observations is 3,390.

2. Model Specification and Results

To evaluate the impact of the independent variable on the risk of democratic breakdown, we utilize a survival model, also known as an event history model or duration model. The application of a survival model enables us to examine the likelihood that a democratic regime experiences democratic breakdown given that the breakdown had not occurred until that time (Maeda, 2010). Among various survival models such as parametric or discrete survival models, the Cox Proportional Hazard model is employed not only because it has been revealed that the Cox model is much more robust (Borucka, 2014), but also because the semi-parametric nature of the Cox model prevents us from making an arbitrary assumption about the shape of underlying hazard rates (Cox, 1972; Schemper, 1992)⁷. Below is the equation for the Cox model used in this article,

$$h(t)=h_0(t)\times\exp(b_1x_1+b_2x_2+\dots+b_px_p)$$

where t denotes the survival time, $h(t)$ represents the hazard function determined by the independent and control variables (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_p) at t , b stands for the estimated coefficients measuring

⁷ Under the false assumption of baseline hazard, the estimates of coefficients and standard errors will be biased and lead wrong inference. Given that we never assure that the shape of baseline hazard of democratic breakdown, we use the Cox model rather than other survival models. See more about parametric models and the risks of false assumptions in Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004)

the impacts of left-hand variables, and $h_0(t)$ means the baseline hazard corresponding to the value of the hazard when all independent and control variables are set to zero.⁸ In our study, the risk set is composed of democratic regimes.

〈Table 3〉 Main Model - Estimations from the Cox Model

Variable	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Z	P-Value	95% Conf. Interval	
Independent Variable						
Pro-Democracy Protest	-0,263	0,059	-4,470	0,001***	-0,379	-0,147
Economic Control Variables						
GDP Growth (%)	0,015	0,010	1,526	0,127	-0,004	0,035
Logged GDP per capita	-0,621	0,095	-6,514	0,000***	-0,807	-0,434
GINI Index	0,038	0,005	7,364	0,000***	0,028	0,048
Urbanization (%)	-0,001	0,000	-4,891	0,000***	-0,001	-0,001
Political & Social Control Variables						
Government System (Baseline: Presidential)						
Semi-Presidential	0,881	0,157	5,625	0,000***	0,574	1,188
Parliamentary	-1,849	0,164	-11,263	0,000***	-2,170	-1,527
Effective Number of Political Parties	-0,049	0,022	-2,200	0,028*	-0,093	-0,005
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-1,954	2,186	-0,883	0,377	-6,239	2,331
International Control Variables						
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	-0,001	0,002	-0,618	0,536	-0,006	0,003
MEPV	-0,346	0,209	-1,650	0,099	-0,755	0,006
Cold War	0,567	0,150	3,772	0,000***	0,272	0,862
Regional Mean Polity Score	-0,118	0,023	-5,089	0,000***	-0,164	-0,073
Number of Observation: 3,390, LR chi2: 1166,790, Prob> chi2: 0,000,						
Log-Likelihood: -2615,767, AIC: 5257,534, BIC: 5335,420						

Note: * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01, *** p < 0,001. Log-Likelihood, Akaike's information criterion (AIC), and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are presented for model comparison.⁹

⁸ We follow the notation from Cox (1972).

⁹ See Kuha (2004) for detailed information about AIC and BIC

Table 3 illustrates the empirical results from the Cox model with control variables. Unlike parametric models and other regression models, the Cox model does not provide estimations on the coefficient of constant because the Cox model is not based on the assumption about the shape of baseline hazard (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). We conduct the Schoenfeld residual diagnostic check developed by Grambsch and Therneau (1994) and Schoenfeld (1982) to test whether the proportional hazard assumption is met or not. The rho-statistics according to each independent and control variable are not statistically significant at the level of $p < 0.05$, which confirms that the main model in Table 3 does not violate the proportional hazard assumption.

The results from Table 3 corroborate our hypothesis. As expected, the independent variable (Pro-Democracy Protest) has a statistically significant negative relationship with the hazard rate of democratic breakdown at the level of $p < 0.001$. The estimated coefficient is -0.263 , which means that one unit increase in the Pro-Democracy Protest decreases the hazard rate of democratic breakdown decreases by 26.3% while all other control variables are held at constant. This finding not only supports our theoretical expectation but also urges scholars to pay more attention to the role of the past civic political movements under the previous authoritarianisms or dictatorships in determining the long-term trajectories of democratic regimes.

Related to control variables, four control variables including GDP Growth, Trade Openness, MPEV, and Ethnolinguistic

Fractionalization do not have statistically significant relationships at any level of p-value. Even though this result is not expected, the null effects of these control variables are consistent with the empirical findings from Slater et al. (2014), Miller (2020), and Maeda (2010). Slater et al. (2014) demonstrate that GDP Growth and Trade Openness do not have a statistically significant influence on regime breakdown, while Miler (2020) and Maeda (2010) show that MEPV and Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization are not associated with regime changes.

On the contrary, we unveil valuable findings on other control variables. First, the logged GDP per capita and Urbanization are statistically significant at the level of $p < 0.001$. The hazard rate of democratic breakdown decreases by 62.1% and 0.1%, if the logged GDP per capita and Urbanization increase by one unit respectively. These findings provide additional empirical evidence for the modernization theory (Inglehart, 1981, 2007). Also, the statistically significant negative sign of Effective Number of Political Parties empirically supports the previous arguments about the conducive influences of multiparty system on democratic survival (Bernhard et al., 2001; Bernhard et al., 2004).

As predicted and demonstrated by previous comparative and small-N cross-national statistical studies, the Cold War era and economic inequality measured by the GINI index tend to increase the hazard rate of democratic breakdown. Compared to those two, the Regional Mean Polity Score is negatively associated with the hazard rate ($p < 0.001$), which finding upholds the claim that the

proliferation of regional democracy promotion norms buttresses democratic survival (Legler & Tiekou, 2010). Also, the main model shows that democratic regimes with parliamentary system tend to have higher survival rates compared to presidential and semi-presidential democracies. It supports the established argument that democratic countries with parliamentary system survive longer than countries with other government systems (Bergmann, Bäck, & Saalfeld, 2021; Przeworski et al., 2000).

Rather than concluding with just one model specification, we estimate three parametric survival models with different assumptions of baseline hazard including Exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz distributions to ensure that the result in Table 3 is not an artifact of the certain model specification. A parametric survival model with the Exponential distribution assumes that the baseline hazard is constant, while a model with the Weibull distribution allows that the monotonic increase or decrease of the baseline hazard over time. The Gompertz distribution is well suited when the log of the baseline hazard is linear over time. It is important to conduct a sensitivity check under various assumptions because we never assure the exact shape of the baseline hazard of democratic breakdown (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).

Moreover, we estimate a frailty survival model to handle the concern of the omitted variable bias. The frailty model allows us to model the latent effects and heterogeneities of each democratic regime on the likelihood of democratic breakdown (Duchateau & Janssen, 2007; Gutierrez, 2002). For instance, the influence of unmeasurable cultural factors, colonial heritage, oil production,

and each regime's degree of civil society repression before democratization are parceled out. This step of robustness check is essential to assess the consistency of the empirical results in the main model and to test whether the results are sensitive to model specifications (Clarke & Stone, 2008; Lueders & Lust, 2018).

<Table 4> Estimations from Alternative Model Specifications

	Model 1 Exponential	Model 2 Weibull	Model 3 Gompertz	Model 4 Frailty
Independent Variable				
Pro-Democracy Protest	-0,236*** (0,053)	-0,241*** (0,056)	-0,286*** (0,060)	-0,386*** (0,116)
Economic Control Variables				
GDP Growth (%)	0,019 (0,010)	0,022 (0,012)	0,018 (0,010)	0,008 (0,009)
Logged GDP per capita	-0,468*** (0,087)	-0,571*** (0,093)	-0,617*** (0,092)	-0,474** (0,150)
GINI Index	0,006 (0,004)	0,036*** (0,005)	0,040*** (0,005)	0,013 (0,008)
Urbanization (%)	-0,001*** (0,000)	-0,001*** (0,000)	-0,001*** (0,000)	-0,009* (0,004)
Political & Social Control Variables				
Government System (Baseline: Presidential)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)
Semi-Presidential	0,717*** (0,142)	0,887*** (0,158)	0,831*** (0,154)	1,559 (0,835)
Parliamentary	-1,048*** (0,140)	-1,673*** (0,157)	-1,905*** (0,166)	-0,410*** (0,142)
Effective Number of Political Parties	-0,061* (0,031)	-0,056* (0,024)	-0,051* (0,023)	-0,188*** (0,048)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	0,196* (0,089)	0,159 (0,098)	0,195 (0,100)	-0,401 (0,532)
International Control Variables				
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	-0,003	-0,003	0,000	-0,002

	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)
MEPV	-0,018	-0,020	-0,021	0,120**
	(0,034)	(0,037)	(0,038)	(0,039)
Cold War	-0,212	0,386**	0,681***	-0,170
	(0,137)	(0,143)	(0,150)	(0,192)
Regional Mean Polity Score	-0,194***	-0,124***	-0,111***	-0,128***
	(0,021)	(0,023)	(0,023)	(0,030)
Constant	0,866	-5,917***	-1,073	0,868
	(0,742)	(0,976)	(0,846)	(1,523)
Number of Observation	3,390	3,390	3,390	3,390
Log Likelihood	-942,478	-672,478	-666,380	-796,101
LR chi2	853,205	1135,744	1165,359	209,852
Prob > chi2	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
AIC	1912,957	1374,957	1362,761	1622,201
BIC	1996,567	1464,539	1452,343	1711,783

Note: * $p < 0,05$, ** $p < 0,01$, *** $p < 0,001$. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. Log-Likelihood, Akaike's information criterion (AIC), and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are presented for model comparison.

Table 4 presents the estimations from the four alternative modeling strategies. As you can see, the Pro-Democracy Protest is statistically significant at the level of $p < 0,001$ across the four models, even though the estimated beta coefficients of the Pro-Democracy Protest are different. Especially in Model 4 (Frailty), the coefficient of the independent variable is $-0,386$ which indicates that the hazard rate of democratic breakdown decreases by 38,6% if a country experienced one more pro-democracy mass protest in the period of democratization. This result supports our hypothesis about the influence of the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest on the likelihood of democratic breakdown. Also, it provides evidence that the empirical result in Table 3 is consistent and robust in other model specifications.

Among the control variables, the level of economic development measured by GDP per capita (Logged), Urbanization (%), Effective Number of Political Parties, Regional Mean Polity Score, and Parliamentary Government System compared to Presidential System are negatively associated with the hazard rate of democratic breakdown across the four models. Compared to the results in Table 3, Model 1 (Exponential) shows that the increase in the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization tends to increase the likelihood of democratic breakdown. Although this result is in the line with the previous argument that the higher fractionalization positively correlates to political instability (Huntington, 1996), it is not statistically significant in the other three models. In addition, Cold War and GINI Index are not statistically significant at any level of p-value in Model 1 (Exponential) and Model 4 (Frailty).

To double-check the robustness of empirical results, we replicate our empirical analysis by distinguishing between nonviolent and violent protests. Previous literature on contentious politics evaluates the impacts of mass protests on democratic transition according to the use of violence in the protests. Some studies demonstrate that nonviolent mass movements tend to entail democratization and democratic consolidation (Bermeo, 1997; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Della Porta, 2014; Kim & Kroeger, 2019), while others demonstrate that violent protests are less effective to achieve successful democratic transition or to prevent democratic backsliding (Chenoweth et al., 2011). Brancati (2016) and Wood (2000) show that even violent protests lead to democratization. Thus,

rather than disregarding the potential heterogeneous impacts of nonviolent and violent pro–democracy mass protests on democratic breakdown, we estimate models by dividing the independent variable, Pro–Democracy Protests, into the nonviolent and violent mass protests. By following academic tradition (Braithwaite et al., 2015), we count both types of mass protests during democratization period based on the classification from the NAVCO 2.0 dataset.

<Table 5> Estimations based on the Distinction between Nonviolent and Violent Protests

	Model 5 Cox	Model 6 Exponential	Model 7 Weibull	Model 8 Gompertz	Model 9 Frailty
Independent Variable					
Nonviolent Pro-Democracy Protest	-0,264*** (0,058)	-0,231*** (0,052)	-0,244*** (0,055)	-0,285*** (0,059)	-0,354** (0,116)
Violent Pro-Democracy Protest	-0,038*** (0,008)	-0,020** (0,008)	-0,037*** (0,008)	-0,036*** (0,008)	-0,018* (0,008)
Economic Control Variables					
GDP Growth (%)	0,012 (0,010)	0,018 (0,010)	0,017 (0,010)	0,014 (0,010)	0,008 (0,009)
Logged GDP per capita	-0,705*** (0,097)	-0,496*** (0,087)	-0,644*** (0,095)	-0,692*** (0,093)	-0,428** (0,151)
GINI Index	0,039*** (0,005)	0,006 (0,004)	0,037*** (0,005)	0,041*** (0,005)	0,012 (0,008)
Urbanization (%)	-0,001*** (0,000)	-0,001*** (0,000)	-0,002*** (0,000)	-0,001*** (0,000)	-0,010*** (0,002)
Political & Social Control Variables					
Government System (Baseline: Presidential)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)	0 (.)

Semi-Presidential	0,819*** (0,158)	0,673*** (0,143)	0,823*** (0,159)	0,765*** (0,155)	1,607 (0,847)
Parliamentary	-1,830*** (0,161)	-1,073*** (0,137)	-1,677*** (0,153)	-1,905*** (0,163)	-0,836*** (0,185)
Effective Number of Political Parties	-0,050* (0,023)	-0,062* (0,032)	-0,058* (0,025)	-0,052* (0,024)	-0,199*** (0,049)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	-1,722 (0,968)	-0,158 (0,310)	-0,407 (0,352)	-0,421 (0,373)	-0,355 (0,858)
International Control Variables					
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	-0,001 (0,002)	-0,006** (0,002)	-0,001 (0,002)	-0,003 (0,002)	-0,001 (0,004)
MEPV	-0,035 (0,038)	-0,024 (0,034)	-0,037 (0,036)	-0,028 (0,038)	0,119** (0,039)
Cold War	0,418** (0,148)	0,168 (0,138)	0,236 (0,141)	0,544*** (0,148)	0,167 (0,189)
Regional Mean Polity Score	-0,089*** (0,023)	-0,185*** (0,021)	-0,098*** (0,023)	-0,085*** (0,024)	-0,114*** (0,030)
Constant		1,138 (0,748)	-5,632*** (0,983)	-0,566 (0,851)	0,482 (1,527)
Number of Observation	3,390	3,390	3,390	3,390	3,390
Log Likelihood	-2602,605	-939,900	-659,297	-654,445	-793,809
LR chi2	1193,115	882,609	1189,146	1215,114	215,171
Prob > chi2	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
AIC	5233,209	1909,800	1350,594	1340,891	1619,617
BIC	5317,087	1999,668	1446,455	1436,751	1715,478

Note: * p<0,05, ** p<0,01, *** p<0,001. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. Log-Likelihood, Akaike's information criterion (AIC), and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are presented for model comparison. The Cox model does not estimate coefficients of constant.

Table 5 shows an interesting finding about the influence of the legacy of nonviolent and violent pro-democracy protests on

democratic breakdown, while the results on control variables are similar to those in Table 3 and Table 4. As presented in Table 5, both the legacies of nonviolent and violent pro–democracy protests are statistically significant at the level of $p < 0.05$, while other factors of democratic breakdown are held at constant. Another noteworthy finding is that the differences in substantive impacts between nonviolent and violent protests are substantial. Across the five models in Table 5, the estimated coefficients of nonviolent pro–democracy mass protests on the hazard rate of democratic breakdown are higher than those of violent pro–democratic ones. The estimated coefficients of nonviolent and violent protests are -0.264 and -0.038 , indicating that the hazard rate decreases by 26.4% and 3.8% respectively for one unit increases in each independent variable. Although 3.8% is still not negligible, it is revealed that the legacy of nonviolent pro–democracy mass protests exerts much more substantive deterrent impacts on democratic breakdown.

V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The fact that democracy is in retreat leads to the increasing flow of academic research on democracy durability. The literature successfully finds various factors related to the durability of

democracy. However, although civil societies and their pro-democracy protests played crucial roles in democratization and the consolidation of democracy as well, few studies have analyzed the effect of pro-democracy protests on democratic breakdown or durability (Croissant & Haynes, 2021; Maeda, 2010). Considering that pro-democracy protests are important in the consolidation of democracy, such a research gap in the previous literature suggests that our understanding of democratic breakdown or democracy durability is still limited.

To contribute to the literature of democratic breakdown, this article examines the conducive influence of the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest on democratic durability. By applying the Cox Proportional Hazard model with data about 135 democratic regimes in 103 democratic countries from 1946 to 2016, this study finds that countries with the legacy pro-democracy mass protest during the transition to democracy are less likely to suffer democratic breakdown. The relationship between the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest and the likelihood of democratic breakdown is consistently robust in alternative model specifications.

To be specific, this article shows that the legacy of pro-democracy protest is one of the significant factors in determining the fates of democracy, which is consistent with the argument from the classic theory for public belief in democracy (Claassen, 2020; Easton, 1975; Inglehart, 2003; Lipset, 1959). As the classic theory has long argued, if people have a strong belief in democracy and

democratic values, they will actively participate in politics to defend democracy whenever it is threatened. On the contrary, if citizens do not have a strong belief in democracy, they do not care whether democracy is threatened or not, and even abandon democracy. Furthermore, our finding on the differences in the substantive impacts of the histories of nonviolent and violent pro-democracy mass protests further endorses previous arguments that the impacts of pro-democracy protests on the quality of democracy are different depending on the use of violence in such protests (Brancati, 2016; Chenoweth et al., 2011; Wood, 2000).

However, even though the empirical results are robust in various model specifications, this study is not free from some limitations. Due to insufficient data, we measured the independent variable, Pro-Democracy Protest, as a count variable. Thus, we cannot fully measure the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest. For instance, the intensity of each pro-democracy protest is not regarded. Thus, the natural direction of future research is to develop a measure of the legacy of pro-democracy protest with more detailed information to analyze its impacts on democratic breakdown and to test the generalizability. In addition, given that the statistical approach allows us to test only the hypothesis, but not the mechanism itself, examining some cases more deeply can broaden our understanding of how the legacy of pro-democracy mass protest deters democratic breakdown.

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