The Impacts of Gender and Previous Cosponsoring Experience of Legislators on the Violence Against Women Bills Sponsorship: An Empirical Analysis of the Korean National Assembly

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Abstract

Even though there has been a global consensus on the detrimental impacts of violence against women, the reasons behind the adoption of legislations addressing violence against women have not been thoroughly examined in the Asian context. With the focus on the role of women's descriptive representation, this article aims to explain variations in lawmakers' sponsorship behaviors on bills addressing violence against women using the original dataset about 67,686 bills proposed in the Korean National Assembly from the 17th (2004–2008) to the 20th (2016–2020) Congress. The empirical findings demonstrate that female legislators have a higher probability of sponsoring violence against women bills compared to their male counterparts. More interestingly, this article finds that there is a statistically and substantially significant relationship between the previous experience of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators and the male legislators' probabilities of sponsoring such bills. The findings are consistently robust in models estimated with the random effects of individual bills.

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I. Introduction

Even though the fundamental way to eradicate and control violence against women, and to help abused women is unquestionably adopting and implementing laws or public policies addressing violence against women, studies about violence against women have been largely conducted in other disciplines such as sociology and criminology rather than in political science. Especially, studies on legislative sponsorship behaviors related to violence against women bills are surprisingly less developed in the Asian context compared to in Western European or in the U.S. context. This is unexpected given that the problem of violence against women is severe in Asian countries. For instance, according to the United Nations Population Fund, formerly the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), up to 68 percent of women have experienced sexual violence.

To fill this academic lacuna, relying on the long-lasting theories about the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation, this article aims to explain variations in lawmakers' sponsorship on bills addressing violence against

women using the original dataset about 67,686 bills proposed in the Korean National Assembly from the 17th (2004–2008) to the 20th (2016–2020) Congress. Using logistic regressions, this article demonstrates that female legislators have a higher probability of sponsoring violence against women bills compared to their male counterparts as expected. More interestingly, I find that there is a statistically and substantially significant relationship between the previous experience of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators and the male legislators' probabilities of sponsoring such bills.

Although South Korea's legislative politics on women's issues especially violence against women have not received much academic attention by the existing literature on Gender and Politics, South Korea is an ideal case to examine such relationships for several reasons. First, there are analytical advantages stemming from the bill sponsorship records existing through the whole period of observation. The data availability related to proposed bills from the 17th Congress to the 20th Congress enables me to fully understand the reasons behind the bill sponsorship concerning violence against women. Even though data on proposed bills is available from the 1st Congress, I only focus on bills proposed from the 17th Congress because the current mixed electoral system composed of proportional representation (PR) and single−member district (SMD) systems was settled down in 2004 (Kweon & Ryan, 2021).

Second, considering that Tsebelis (2002) demonstrates that

executive dominance over legislative bodies on agenda-setting has been frequently observed in parliamentary democracies unlike presidential democracies. South Korea which is a presidential democracy is a valuable case where the Korean National Assembly plays an important role in shaping legislative agenda on violence against women. In addition, South Korea is a country where both women's descriptive and substantive representation in terms of violence against women laws and policies have progressed dramatically in a relatively short period, which provides enough variations to be examined. Furthermore, examining the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation in terms of legal reforms combating violence against women with the Korean case will broaden our understanding of the influence of women's descriptive representation in policy outcomes in the Asian context.

This article proceeds in the following order. First, a thorough literature review on the problem of violence against women, and the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation will be presented. Then, theoretical backgrounds on the influence of women's descriptive representation on the adoption or implementation of violence against women laws and policies will be introduced. In addition, a series of hypotheses about the impacts of gender of legislators and the influences of the cosponsorship experience with female lawmakers on the legislative behaviors on bill sponsorship will be provided. In the empirical analysis section, the original Korean National

Assembly dataset, modeling strategy, and empirical results will be illustrated. Finally, I conclude with discussions on the potential contributions of this article.

II. Literature Review

1. The Problem of Violence Against Women

Violence against women, indicating "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life" (UN Women, 1993), has received great attention based on not only domestic but also international perspectives (Htun & Weldon, 2012; Montoya, 2013; Woo, 2021). Even though definitions of violence against women can vary widely, violence against women typically includes intimate partner violence, physical assault, sexual violence and harassment, and domestic violence (Montoya, 2013). Also, according to the Global Database on Violence against Women developed by UN Women, the forms of violence against women include domestic or intimate partner violence, trafficking, sexual violence and harassment, female genital mutilation, child, early and forced marriage, stalking, and

feminicide.

Violence against women, which is not a new phenomenon, is an exacting problem regardless of the level of development, regime types, regions, religions, cultures, or histories (Woo, 2021). According to the analysis from UN Women, 35 percent of women in the world experience sexual violence including trafficking, stalking, early childhood marriage, forced marriage forced sex, female genital mutilation, etc. Violence against women is also widely spread in politics (Krook, 2020) and it imposes profoundly negative impacts on women's life. Abused women who experience violence against women have suffered from severe physical and mental health consequences (Babu & Kar, 2009; Ellsberg, Jansen, Heise, Watts, & Garcia-Moreno, 2008).

In South Korea, violence against women especially domestic and intimate partner violence is especially severe and women's activism against violence against women was galvanized by the emergence of the #MeToo movement in late 2016 (Hasunuma & Shin, 2019; Shin, 2021). In the recent 2022 presidential election in South Korea, violence against women was also regarded as one of the most salient issues. Given the severity of violence against women and its negative impacts on women's integrity, the reasons behind the legislative efforts to prevent violence against women unexpectedly have not been thoroughly examined. Even though some previous studies have examined the influence of gender on legislative behaviors in the Korean National Assembly (Kweon & Ryan, 2021; Shim, 2019), the issue of violence against women and legislative

behaviors concerning this issue have not been solely examined. Thus, this article focusing on the role of women's descriptive representation explains why and when legislations focus on sponsoring bills concerning violence against women.

2. Women's Descriptive and Substantive Representation

The influence of women's descriptive representation on the substantive representation of women has widely been studied by scholars (Atkinson & Windett, 2019; Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Pitkin, 1967; Swers, 2002). Previous studies handle various questions such as does women's descriptive representation lead to substantive representation (Pitkin, 1967) and do female legislators can make differences in a polity such as attitudes, interests, priorities, and differences in policy outcomes (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Norris, 1996). Gender differences between female and male legislators have been studied with different focuses: attitudes, priorities, and policy promotion.

Differences in attitudes between female and male legislators are widely studied by scholars and there is a consent that gender influences the attitudes which individual legislators have (Esaiasson & Holmberg, 2017; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995), even though some debates about the degree of the influence exist. As Wängnerud (2009) summarized, the direction of the gender gap in political attitudes between female and male legislators is relatively clear. A series of studies show that female legislators tend to be more liberal

or politically left compared to their male colleagues (Thomas, 1991; Thomas & Wilcox, 2014) and Shim (2021a) examining the cases of South Korea and Taiwan demonstrated that female legislators are more likely to stress women's issues (also see, Shim, 2021b). Some previous literature, especially in the U.S. context, argues that there has been a growing divide between Democratic and Republican women and similarity among male and female legislators in the same political parties, and emphasizes the crucial role of a political party (Osborn, 2012).

While attitudes are the matter of "on the issues" which are already politicized, priorities are related to what kinds of issues will be politicized or put on the agenda (Wängnerud, 2009). There has been a consensus that female representatives tend to prioritize women's issues, even though empirical results can be different based on how researchers determine and measure women's issues. For instance, Atkinson and Windett (2019) analyze all bills introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1963 to 2009 and demonstrate that female representative tends to devote more attention to issues including "civil rights, and liberties", "education", "health", "law, crime, and family issues," and "social welfare compared to their male counterparts. In addition, Tam (2017) finds that female legislators in an undemocratic or semi-democratic legislature are more likely to focus on women's interests rather than male legislators do by conducting a case study of Hong Kong.

Unlike attitudes and priorities, the policy outcome or policy

promotion that women legislators can make has been relatively less examined. Given the importance of politics in citizens' everyday lives, the evaluation of the link between women's descriptive representation and substantive representation including policy changes should be conducted to fully understand the influence of women's descriptive representation and the differences that women representatives can make (Bratton & Ray, 2002; Courtemanche & Green, 2017).

Even though the relative deficiency of studies about policy outcomes that women can make, there are also previous studies on this topic (Bratton & Ray, 2002; Caiazza, 2004; Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009; Thomas, 1991). For example, Cowell-Meyers and Langbein (2009) demonstrate that a higher level of women's descriptive representation in state legislatures tends to lead states to adopt policies favoring women, and Eckhouse (2019) relying on a case study in the United States shows that descriptive representation improves criminal justice. Studies about the link between women's descriptive representation and substantive representation are not only confined to the U.S., but also conducted with a focus on other countries in various regions of the world (Kittilson, 2008; Wiener, 2021). Lee and Lee (2020) examining gender-related bills in the Korean National Assembly found that being a female tends to increase the likelihood of the success of gender-related bills.

However, findings on the association between women's descriptive representation and substantive representation are

mixed at best (Courtemanche & Green, 2017; Wängnerud, 2009). There are some studies which demonstrate that the influence of women's descriptive representation in parliaments on policy outcomes and policy promotions is insignificant, at best very marginal. For instance, Tolbert and Steuernagel (2001) show that the presence of women in the state legislature in the 1990s and women in leadership positions does not influence the adoption of policies regarding women's health policies. In terms of cross-national study, Htun and Weldon (2012)'s crucial work on the association between female autonomous movement and progressive policy change focusing on violence against women also does not support the influence of women's descriptive representation on policy outcomes. In addition, some studies on individual countries have also provided empirical support for the null effects of the women's presence in legislative branches on the comprehensiveness of violence against women legislations (Beer, 2017).

Likewise, the previous findings on the influence of women's descriptive representation on women's substantive representation in terms of policy outcomes are conflicting. Moreover, the literature has largely focused on the cases of the Western European countries and the U.S. Thus, this article relying on the original dataset on the Korean National Assembly from 2004 to 2020 contributes to the existing literature by examining whether the gender of individual legislators affects legislative sponsorship behaviors on violence against women bills from the start. Moreover, given that previous studies on the influence of

gender on legislative behaviors have focused on the independent impact of gender, this article tries to broaden our understanding of the impact of gender by examining how previous experiences of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators affect legislative behaviors of male counterparts.

III. Theories and Hypotheses

Does the gender of individual legislators affect their bill sponsorships on violence against women bills? Pitkin (1967)'s argument about the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation gives a clue to the crucial role of women's descriptive representation in the legislation of laws and policies addressing violence against women. She explains political representation as an activity making voters present in the process of policy−making, descriptive representation as a body reflecting the features including gender, and substantive representation as a body mirroring the interests of the groups. Pitkin (1967) emphasizes that the improvement of "descriptive representation" engenders "substantive representation".

In addition to the argument from Pitkin (1967), the critical mass theory developed by Kanter (1977) has been widely applied to studies supporting the link between women's descriptive

and substantive representation (Celis & Childs, 2008; Cowell-Meyers & Langbein, 2009; Homola, 2021). According to the critical mass theory, the improvement of women's descriptive representation is a prerequisite to achieving women's substantive representation. She argues that the minorities such as female in a skewed group tend to be dominated by the majorities, and the tokenization of minorities are likely to lead to poor performance of the minorities. Kanter (1977) maintains that there should be enough proportion of minorities for the minorities to break the vicious cycle of tokenization.

Similarly, Phillips (1995) argues that women's descriptive representation is a driving factor of achieving women's substantive representation in her politics of presence theory (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1998; Tamerius, 2010). She mentions that the shared experience between female representatives and female citizens is a core element of the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation. There has been a series of studies supporting the politics of presence theory (Lawless, 2015; Swers, 2016; Wangnerud & Sundell, 2012; Woo, 2021). For example, Mansbridge (1999) relying on a case of the U.S. demonstrates that female representatives tend to focus on legal reforms to handle the problems that female citizens are likely to experience due to their common female identity.

It should be noted that there are various approaches to explain the association between women's descriptive and substantive representation. For instance, the ethics of care developed by Gilligan (1982) shows that women are more likely

to care about women's issues including the problem of violence against women, because women, unlike men, have generally been taught compassion and empathy (Rabe-Hemp, 2008). Despite the different explanations from the above-mentioned theories, they try to explain the positive association between women's descriptive and substantive representation. Relying on this existing literature, this article examines whether the gender of individual legislators is a driving factor in sponsoring bills about violence against women.

Hypothesis 1: Female legislators are more likely to sponsor bills addressing violence against women compared to male legislators are, while all other things being equal.

In addition to the direct influence of women's descriptive representation, this article goes one step further based on the previous literature focusing on the influence of women's parliamentary descriptive representation and the difference between male and female legislators (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Rosenthal, 1995; Swers, 2002; Wängnerud, 2009), and tests the influence of legislative networks with female legislators on the legislative behaviors of male legislators. I argue that the previous experience of sponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators makes male legislators focus on the issue of violence against women.

This article builds a theory and hypothesis based on the

rational approach to legislators' policy-making behaviors. Proposing bills requires legislators to invest their limited resources including time and budgets. Assuming legislators are risk-averse, the limitation of accessing information about specific issues will prevent legislators from engaging in proposing bills about the issues, because of the conditions of relative uncertainty where legislators cannot be sure about the results (Krehbiel, 1992). Based on the previous findings, female legislators have easier access to information about women's issues such as violence against women and they already have more information compared to male counterparts because of women's expertise and shared experience (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Rosenthal, 1995; Swers, 2002; Wängnerud, 2009). Thus, male legislators with less information and interest in women's issues are less likely to invest their efforts into proposing bills about women's issues.

Previous literature on political communication and political behaviors provides a clue for how male legislators can be affected by conversing with other female representatives through legislative networks. It has been argued that the acquisition of political information affects individuals' ability to make political decisions and to express their opinions (Buschman, 2018; Eveland, 2004). At the citizen-level, the existing studies have also provided empirical evidence for the link between political communication and the diffusion of both political knowledge and information, which in turn affects political behaviors (Ikeda, Kobayashi, & Richey, 2012; Tolochko, Song, & Boomgaarden, 2019). The mechanism behind the

association is that individuals tend to gain information from political communication facilitating exposure to the information of interest and the conversation provides individuals an additional opportunity for interpersonal diffusion of political knowledge and information (Petty & Krosnick, 2014). Moreover, while communicating with each other, political knowledge and information might be elaborated through information processing (Eveland, 2004).

By applying the previous citizen-level studies to elite-level ones, I expect that male legislators with previous experience of sponsoring violence against women bills with female representatives have less informatic limitations on proposing bills about violence against women, because they can get information from female legislators through political communication. The decreased uncertainty to propose bills about violence against women will lead male legislators to propose more bills about violence against women. The previous findings from Fowler (2006b), qualitatively demonstrating that cosponsorship networks promote the interactions among the cosponsors and lead sponsors, also make such expectations reasonable (also see, Fowler, 2006a). Thus, this article examines whether male legislators with experience in sponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators are more likely to sponsor such bills.

Hypothesis 2: Male legislators with experience of sponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators are more likely to sponsor bills addressing violence against women, while all other things being equal.

IV. Empirical Analysis

1. Data

Dependent Variables

As a dependent variable, I use *Bill Sponsorship.* To build Bill Sponsorship, I, first, collected all information about each bill proposed in the Korean National Assembly from 2004 (the start of the 17th Congress) to 2020 (the end of the 20th Congress) based on the Bill Information System developed by the Korean National Assembly. The Bill Information System provides detailed information about proposed bills such as their proposed date, lists of sponsors, contents of each bill, and results of each bill. In total, 67,686 bills have been proposed from the 17th Congress to the 20th Congress. Then, I, relying on keywords related to violence against women, classify whether each bill is a bill addressing violence against women.

To be specific, first, I drop 5,820 bills proposed by the Korean government. Next, I select bills with titles including the following keywords: feminicide, forced sterilization, stalking, trafficking, violence against women and girls, domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual violence, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, child, early and forced marriage, protection of women and children, and victims of violence against women. Third, I also select bills with contents including the above-mentioned

[Table 1] Summary of Randomly Sampled Bills in Each Congress

Congress Numbe	Bill Number	Title
17	170140	Amendment bill on the act on special cases concerning the punishment of crimes of domestic violence
17	170640	Amendment bill on the act on the punishment of arrangement of commercial sex acts
17	171181	Amendment bill on the act on the punishment of sexual crimes and protection of victims
18	1806285	Partial amendment bill on the act on the punishment of sexual crimes and protection of victims
18	1808619	Partial amendment bill on the act on the punishment of arrangement of commercial sex acts
18	1808885	Partial amendment bill on the act on the protection of children and youth against sex offenses
19	1901781	Partial amendment bill on the act on the protection of children and youth against sex offenses
19	1906663	Partial amendment bill on the act on the protection of children and youth against sex offenses
19	1911993	Partial amendment bill on the act on the prevention of domestic violence and protection of victims
20	2008108	The act on the punishment of stalking crimes and protection of victims
20	2016718	Partial amendment bill on the act on special cases concerning the punishment of sexual crimes
20	2024182	Partial amendment bill on the act on the protection of children and youth against sex offenses

Note: Detailed information on each bill can be found in the Bill Information System developed by the Korean National Assembly.

keywords. Lastly, given that this approach might include bills not related to violence against women, I review the selected bills to exclude bills not relevant to violence against women. As a result, 1,878 bills among 67,686 bills are categorized into the violence against women bills. To build *Bill Sponsorship*, I assign 1 to "Bill ID – Individual Legislators" observations when legislators sponsor violence against women bills. Otherwise, 0 is assigned to observations. Table 1 presents the lists of randomly selected bills in each congress from 2004 to 2020, which justifies the way this

article relies on the classification of violence against women bills.

Independent Variables

First, to examine whether women legislators pay more attention to the problem of violence against women and focus on sponsoring bills concerning violence against women, I include Gender (0 – male legislators, 1 – female legislators) as an independent variable. Furthermore, to evaluate the influence of the previous experience of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators, this article employs the logged number of cosponsoring violence against women bills with other female legislators. The log−transformation is employed with the expectation that the impacts of the previous cosponsorship experience do not monotonically increase the log−odds of sponsoring violence against women bills of male legislators.

Control Variables

To prevent coefficient estimations from being biased due to the omitted variable bias, a series of control variables are controlled. I first control Seniority of legislators. Some previous studies on seniority have shown that senior lawmakers tend to have higher legislative effectiveness than junior representatives do (Taylor, 2019). At the same time, other studies in the Korean context have demonstrated that the seniority of legislators leads lawmakers to pay more attention to the unification and national security issues, and to initiate less number of bills (Jeong, 2019;

Jeong & Jang, 2013), while Lee and Lee (2020) demonstrated that the seniority of legislators does not have a statistically significant impact on legislative behaviors. Thus, this article chooses to control the influence of the seniority of legislators on sponsorship concerning violence against women rather than disregarding the debates of the previous literature.

Second, given that South Korea has a two–tiered electoral system composed of a district tier (single-member district) and a party tier (proportional representation), Electoral Tier of legislators is controlled. I assign 0 to "Bill ID – Individual Legislators" observations if legislators were elected from single–member districts; otherwise, 1 is assigned. The inclusion of Electoral Tier is based on the rationale that lawmakers elected from single–member districts tend to focus on the specific problems and issues related to their districts rather than more general issues such as the problems of violence against women to increase the probability of being re–elected (Kweon & Ryan, 2021).

Third, *Electoral Cycle* is also controlled. The rationale behind this choice is that legislators might initiate or sponsor more bills before the next election. It is a common sense that voters have been regarded to weigh legislators' participation in bill proposals or sponsorships more during the election period to assess and evaluate their representatives. Thus, instead of running the risk of the omitted variable bias, this article decides to parcel out the expected positive influence of Electoral Cycle on sponsorship on violence against women bills. I assign 1 to "Bill ID – Individual

Legislators" observations when bills were initiated one year before the general elections; otherwise, I assign 0.

In addition, based on Kweon and Ryan (2021), the fixed effects of *Congress* and Party Affiliation are also included as controls. The inclusion of Congress enables me to control unobserved and unmeasured congress-specific influence on the probability of sponsoring bills about violence against women such as the total number of bills proposed in each congress (Gelman & Wilson, 2021). In addition, the fixed effects of *Congress* make it possible to parcel out the influence of the growing feminist and #MeToo movements since 2016 which is the start of the 20th Congress (Kim, 2018).

Moreover, party affiliations of individual legislators are also controlled given that there have been studies unveiling heterogeneities among female legislators according to their partisanships (Kweon & Ryan, 2021; Osborn & Kreitzer, 2014; Shim, 2019). Given that the South Korean party system is highly structured by elite networks and political dynasties based on strong regional connections (Lee & Singer, 2020), it is a prerequisite to control the influence of party affiliations to isolate the impacts of independent variables on bill sponsorship concerning violence against women. This article relies on the information provided by the Korean National Assembly to track party affiliations of legislators over time.

Lastly, this article also controls a series of leadership positions of legislators in the Korean National Assembly. This decision is based on previous studies which found that legislative

behaviors of representatives in leadership positions might be different from legislators not in the positions (Barnes, 2016; Kweon & Ryan, 2021; Shim, 2019). For instance, Kweon and Ryan (2021) demonstrated that committee leaders sponsor only 1.43 percent of based bills. Thus, this article controls the following leadership positions: committee chair, party leader, floor leader, and speaker of the assembly. The four control variables are binary variables which are assigned to 1 if legislators are in that position.

Descriptive statistics of all variables employed are presented in Table 2. Again, the unit of analysis is "Bill ID – Individual Legislators" and the number of observations is determined by the multiplication of the number of proposed bills and the number of legislators. Across all the empirical models estimated in the next section, the mean and individual variance inflation factors (VIFs) of independent and control variables do not exceed 2, indicating that there is no problematic multicollinearity among explanatory variables (Allison, 2012).

[Table 2] Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variable					
Bill Sponsorship	612367	0.031	0.173	0	1
Independent Variables					
Gender	612367	0.155	0.362	0	1
Cosponsorship with Female Legislators	612367	5.422	1.312	0.000	8.081
Control Variables					
Seniority	612367	2.570	1.425	1	8
Electoral Tier	612367	0.176	0.381	0	1
Electoral Cycle	612367	0.271	0.444	0	1
Committee Chair	612367	0.124	0.331	0	1
Party Leader	612367	0.022	0.167	0	1
Floor Leader	612367	0.040	0.194	0	1
Speaker of Assembly	612367	0.021	0.167	0	1

Note: As mentioned earlier, congress and party affiliation fixed effects are also included as controls.

2. Modeling Strategy and Empirical Results

Given the nature of the dependent variable, *Bill Sponsorship*, logistic regression is applied to examine the influence of independent variables. In addition, robust standard errors are estimated instead of normal standard errors. To examine the influence of gender and the experience of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators on the probability of sponsoring such bills related to violence against women, I start by estimating two logistic regression models on *Bill Sponsorship.* Model 1 is estimated with a full set of independent and control variables, while Model 2 is estimated based on the split—sample which only includes male legislators.

[Table 3] Estimations from Logistic Regression Models

	Model 1	Model 2
Independent Variables		
Gender	0.306***	
	(0.020)	
Cosponsorship with Female Legislators	0.270***	0.272***
	(0.008)	(0.009)
Control Variables		
Seniority	-0.189***	-0.195***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Electoral Tier	0.177***	0.142***
	(0.022)	(0.028)
Electoral Cycle	-0.269***	-0.220***
	(0.017)	(0.020)
Committee Chair	0.068	0.072
	(0.051)	(0.052)
Party Leader	-0.315	-0.342
	(0.261)	(0.351)
Floor Leader	0.018	0.044
	(0.084)	(0.064)
Speaker of Assembly	0.193	0.243
	(0.174)	(0.185)
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Party Affiliation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.603***	-4.599***
	(0.044)	(0.050)
Number of Observations	612367	516608
AIC	167457.445	131979.509
BIC	167559.371	132068.749
Log-Pseudolikelihood	-83719.723	-65981.755

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors clustered to legislator IDs in parentheses.

Both Model 1 and Model 2 have similar results on each independent and control variable, the results reveal that female

legislators (Gender=1), previous experience of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators, and PR-elected legislators have statistically significant positive relationships with the log-odds of sponsoring bills about violence against women at the level of $p < 0.001$. On the contrary, seniority and electoral cycle have statistically significant relationships with the dependent variables at the level of $p < 0.001$ in negative directions. It should be noted that the empirical results presented in Table 3 are similar to those in the rare event logistic regression models (Table A.1 in Appendix) developed by King and Zeng (2001) to adjust potential biases due to analyzing a rare event as a dependent variable. In addition, even after the *Cosponsorship with Female Legislators* is weighted by the number of previous female cosponsors by multiplication (Table A.2 in Appendix), the empirical results do not change significantly.

In Model 1, first of all, the estimated coefficient of *Gender* is 0.306, meaning that women legislators have 0.306 higher log odds of sponsoring violence against women bills than male counterparts have. It is consistent with an expectation that women legislators tend to pay more attention to the problem of violence against women. In terms of the previous experience of cosponsorship with female legislators, the estimated coefficient is 0.270 in Model 1. This result supports the argument that having experience of cosponsorship violence against women bills with female legislators leads legislators to pay more attention to women's rights and integrity. This relationship is consistent in

Model 2 where only male legislators are included in the sample, which provides empirical evidence that the legislative behaviors of male legislators can be influenced by working with female counterparts.

The results presented in Table 3 also reveal other interesting findings related to control variables: *Seniority, Electoral Tier, and Electoral Cycle.* First, Seniority in both Model 1 and Model 2 is statistically significant with a negative sign at the level of $p <$ 0.001. This finding is not consistent with the previous findings on the conducive impacts of seniority on legislative effectiveness and sponsorship especially in the U.S. context. Unlike the previous literature on seniority in the U.S. context, this result provides empirical support for the findings in the Korean context. It has been revealed that more senior members are more likely to focus on the issues of national security and unification (Ka, 2009) and generally tend to propose fewer bills (Jeong & Jang, 2013).

Electoral Tier is statistically significant at the level of $p <$ 0.001, meaning that legislators elected through the PR electoral system are more likely to sponsor bills about violence against women. It is consistent with my expectation that PR-elected legislators pay more attention to general issues including women's rights rather than district-specific bills. In addition, Electoral Cycle has a statistically significant negative relationship with the log-odds of sponsoring such bills in both Model 1 and Model 2. Even though this relationship is not anticipated, it is not a nonsensical finding because legislators tend to focus on their

election campaigns to maximize their probability of being re-elected. Given that PR-elected legislators are usually not being nominated by their political parties again, this explanation can be applied to both PR-elected and SMD-elected legislators.

In terms of leadership positions, this article finds null effects of the four leadership positions including *Committee Chair, Party Leader, Floor Leader, and Speaker of Assembly.* Even though the null effects of the leadership positions are not expected, this finding is consistent with the previous empirical findings from Kweon and Ryan (2021) that leadership positions including party leader, floor leader, and committee member do not influence sponsorship of legislators on women's issues. Moreover, even though not statistically significant, *Speaker of Assembly* displays the same positive direction on bill sponsorship concerning violence against women.

To examine the substantive impacts of the statistically significant variables in Table 3, I estimate predicted probabilities based on each variable. Figure 1 presents the estimated predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals while all other variables are held at their observed values, with kernel or normal density of independent and control variables. Overall, the statistically significant variables are not only statistically significant, but also substantively meaningful. Female legislators have 3.956% of sponsoring violence against women bills, while male legislators have 2.948%. In terms of the previous experience of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female colleges,

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
Note: Predicted Probabilities are presented with 95% confidence intervals with the kernel or normal density of each independent and control variable. Predicted Probabilities are estimated while all other variables are held at their observed values.

Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities of Sponsoring Violence Against Women Bills

the predicted probability increases from 0.693% to 2.011% when the *logged Cosponsorship with Female Legislators increases* from 0 to 4. It reaches 5.671% if the independent variable increases to 8.

[Table 4] Estimations with Bill Random Effect

	Model 1	Model 2
Independent Variables		
Gender	0.325***	
	(0.027)	
Cosponsorship with Female Legislators	0.700***	0.692***
	(0.032)	(0.034)
Control Variables		
Seniority	-0.378***	-0.377***
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Electoral Tier	0.143***	0.120***
	(0.027)	(0.032)
Electoral Cycle	-0.372***	-0.294***
	(0.065)	(0.062)
Committee Chair	0.068	0.071
	(0.058)	(0.062)
Party Leader	-0.337	-0.315
	(0.264)	(0.334)
Floor Leader	0.018	0.038
	(0.045)	(0.048)
Speaker of Assembly	0.175	0.233
	(0.157)	(0.184)
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Party Affiliation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Bill ID Random Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-7.000***	-6.957***
	(0.183)	(0.191)
var(constant)	1.356***	1.297***
	(0.079)	(0.075)
Number of Observations	612367	516608
AIC	153636.269	120684.025
BIC	153749.520	120784.420
Log-Pseudolikelihood	-76808.135	-60333.012

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors clustered to legislator IDs in parentheses.

The four control variables including *Seniority, Electoral Tier, Electoral Cycle, and Congress* are also substantively significant. Legislators who are first elected have 4.142%, while legislators elected five times have 1.992%. It decreases to around 1% if legislators have been elected more than eight times. Related to Electoral Tier, the predicted probability of PR-elected legislators to sponsor bills about violence against women is 3.581% which is 0.562% higher than the probability of legislators elected from single-member districts. In terms of Electoral Cycle, legislators have 2.579% predicted probability of sponsoring violence against women bills during one year before the election. During normal years, they have 3.343% predicted probability.

Rather than concluding with only one modeling strategy, this article conducts a robustness check with an alternative model specification with the inclusion of bill random effects. The inclusion of bill random effects prevents empirical results from being biased due to the idiosyncratic features of individual proposed bills. For example, some previous literature has found empirical evidence that lawmakers tend to sponsor bills related to salient issues compared to non-salient issues to do position-taking (Achen, 1978; Curry & Haydon, 2018). Given that the inclusion of fixed effects of proposed bills might reduce the degree of freedom and lead to perfect predictions (Bell & Jones, 2015), this article relies on random effects rather than fixed effects of bills.

As presented in Table 4, the findings on the sponsorship for bills addressing violence against women are consistently

robust in logistic regression models with the random effect of Bill ID. Despite slight differences in the estimated coefficients, the directions of coefficients and significances are similar to those presented in Table 3. For instance, even after I control idiosyncratic features of bills by including bill random effects as a control variable, the independent variables, Gender and *Cosponsorship with Female Legislators,* are statistically significant at the level of 0.01 p-value. The findings on control variables are similar to those in Table 3. Moreover, even though not presented, the substantive impacts in terms of predicted probabilities do not change dramatically. Thus, the results from Table 4 provide additional support for the robustness of the findings that female legislators are more likely to sponsor bills concerning violence against women, and male legislators with previous experience of sponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators tend to sponsor such bills more.

V. Conclusion and Discussion

Violence against women is an imminent problem threatening women's integrity and rights. However, despite the severity of violence against women over the globe including in Asian countries, the reasons behind the adoption and implementation

of laws have not been thoroughly examined. To fill this research void, this article examines why some countries adopt and implement violence against women laws and public policies, using the original data on the 67,686 proposed bills in the Korean National Assembly from the 1^{7th} to the 20th Congress. Employing logistic regression, this article demonstrates that gender of individual legislators is a driving factor of sponsoring bills addressing violence against women. To be specific, female legislators have a higher probability of sponsoring violence against women bills compared to their male counterparts. More interestingly, I find that there is a statistically and substantially significant relationship between the previous experience of cosponsoring violence against women bills with female legislators and the male legislators' probabilities of sponsoring such bills.

The findings from this article make the following academic contributions. Even though some studies on Asian countries have demonstrated that gender is one of the most influential factors in determining legislative behaviors on women's issues (Kweon & Ryan, 2021; Shim, 2019; Woo, 2021), the issue of violence against women and especially legislative behaviors concerning violence against women have not been examined thoroughly at the level of individual legislators. Thus, the South Korean case study on 67,686 bills proposed from 2004 (the start of the 17th Congress) to 2020 (the end of the 20th Congress) and the empirical finding that female legislators are more likely to promote violence against women bills rather than their male counterparts broaden our understanding on the

influence of gender on individual lawmakers' legislative behaviors concerning the issue of violence against women.

More importantly, this article also contributes by demonstrating that male legislators with more experience in cosponsoring violence against women bills with female counterparts are more likely to sponsor such bills. Considering that previous literature on gender and politics has largely focused on the influence of gender on legislative behaviors while disregarding how the interactions among female and male legislators affect legislative behaviors (Celis & Childs, 2008; Htun & Weldon, 2012; Reingold et al., 2021; Swers, 2016), the finding that legislative behaviors can be affected by working with other legislators raises an important point that we need to consider the influence of the entrance of women in legislative branches can also alter the legislative behaviors of male legislators. Such an empirical finding also provides support for the determinant influence of political interactions among legislators through legislative networks, which have been qualitatively theorized by the literature on political communication and political behaviors (Buschman, 2018). At the same time, this finding provides a clue for the reasons why previous studies do not reach a consensus on the influence of gender composition in legislative branches on policy outcomes.

With the above-mentioned potential contributions from this article, there are some limitations that should be dealt with in future research. First, as other empirical studies do not, this article only tests the hypotheses not the theories themselves.

Even though the empirical evidence supports the influence of gender and the impacts of previous experience of sponsoring bills with female legislators on individual legislators' bill sponsorship concerning violence against women, the empirical analysis does not show how the relationship works (Esarey & Danneman, 2015; Lijphart, 1971).

In addition, this article only relies on the case of the Korean National Assembly, meaning that the generalizability of the empirical finding from this article should be tested with data from other countries. Especially, given that the association between previous experience with female legislators and bill sponsorship concerning violence against women has not been empirically studied, the natural direction of future studies is re-examining the suggested relationship with more nuanced empirical analysis such as network analysis. Moreover, given that the influence of gender can be conditioned by the percentage of female legislators in legislative branches (Kanter 1977), examining the interaction effects between legislators' gender and the seat share of female legislators will be promising.

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Byung-Deuk Woo, The Impacts of Gender and Previous Cosponsoring Experience of Legislators on the Violence Against Women Bills Sponsorship: An Empirical Analysis of the Korean National Assembly

[Appendix]

[Table A.1] Estimations from Rare Event Logistic Regression Models

	Model A.1	Model A.2
Independent Variables		
Gender	0.313***	
	(0.020)	
Cosponsorship with Female Legislators	0.280***	0.273***
	(0.008)	(0.009)
Control Variables		
Seniority	-0.186***	-0.174***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Electoral Tier	0.155***	0.149***
	(0.022)	(0.023)
Electoral Cycle	-0.270***	-0.287***
	(0.017)	(0.020)
Committee Chair	0.020	0.071
	(0.079)	(0.056)
Party Leader	-0.476	-0.321
	(0.351)	(0.359)
Floor Leader	0.021	0.044
	(0.153)	(0.073)
Speaker of Assembly	0.198	0.240
	(0.188)	(0.191)
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Party Affiliation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-4.669***	-4.632***
	(0.046)	(0.050)
Number of Observations	612367	516608
AIC	167672.792	134917.750
BIC	167593.522	134840.165
Log-Pseudolikelihood	-83789.760	-67413.082

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors clustered to legislator IDs in parentheses.

[Table A.2] Estimations from Logistic Regression Models with Weighted Cosponosrship Experience

	Model A.1	Model A.2
Independent Variables		
Gender	0.312***	
	(0.020)	
Cosponsorship with Female Legislators Weighted by the number of previous Female Cosponsors	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Control Variables		
Seniority	-0.190***	-0.193***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Electoral Tier	0.175***	0.137***
	(0.022)	(0.028)
Electoral Cycle	-0.267***	-0.220***
	(0.018)	(0.020)
Committee Chair	0.022	0.072
	(0.080)	(0.057)
Party Leader	-0.478	-0.326
	(0.350)	(0.368)
Floor Leader	0.025	0.047
	(0.155)	(0.081)
Speaker of Assembly	0.201	0.245
	(0.190)	(0.204)
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Party Affiliation Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-3.369***	-3.364***
	(0.048)	(0.021)
Number of Observations	612367	516608
AIC	167860.877	132436.975
BIC	167962.819	132503.918
Log-Pseudolikelihood	-83921.438	-66212.487

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Robust standard errors clustered to legislator IDs in parentheses.